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532 !£BARD 11. RICHFIELD OIL CORP. [56 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 25991. In Bank. Aug. 81,1961.] 
MARY V. LEBARD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RICHFIELD 
.OIL CORPORATION et al, Defendants and Respondents. 
[1] Oil-Regulation-Well Spacing: Leases-Royalties.-Pub. Re-
sources Code, § 3608, giving the owner of land less than an 
acre in area and surrounded by lands subject to an oil lease 
of an acre or more the right to share in the production under 
the lease, provides, not that the owners of the oil and gas 
mineral rights at the time the land is deemed included shall 
receive the royalties, but that after that time the owners of 
those rights shall receive the royalties. Since the statute 
contemplates a continuing relationship between the owners of 
those rights and the lessee, it is the current owners who are 
to be paid. 
[2] Id.-Regulation-Well Spacing: Leases-Royalties.-Pub. Re-
sources Code, § 3608, is valid and gives an owner of property 
of less than an acre in area an adequate means of protection 
or substitute for his right to extract oil from his property. 
That right belongs to the owner of the land and passes with 
a conveyance of the land unless it is severed by a reservation 
or has been severed by a prior grant. To be effective, a sub-
stitute for that right must necessarily inure to its owner; the 
code section provides that it does so inure and in no way 
purports to sever the right to receive royalties from the owner-
ship of the oil and gas mineral rights for the duration of the 
lease in which the land is deemed included. 
[3] Id. - Regulation - Well Spacing: Leases - Royalties - Com-
munity Lease.-Pub. Resources Code, § 3608, does not in effect 
make an owner of property of less than an acre in area a com-
munity lessor with the lessors of the surrounding lands sub-
ject to an oil lease of an acre or more, and the rules governing 
community oil leases do not fit the pattern established by § 8608 
for compensating owners who have been deprived of the right 
to recover oil and gas from their lands, but are based on the 
existence of cross-conveyances, concerning which the code sec-
tion makes no provision. 
[4] Id. - Regulation - Well Spacing: Leases - Royalties - Com-
munity Lease.-The rules governing community oil leases re-
quire segregating the oil and gas produced from each parcel 
included in the lease, since the lessor's royalty from oil and 
gas produced from his own land is appurtenant whereas his 
royalty from oil and gas produced from his colessors is in gross. 
[1] See OalJur.2d, Oil and Gas, §§ 301, 811. 
Mclt. Dig. References: [1-5] Oil, §§ 3.1, 30. 
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Pub. Resources Code, § 3608, providing for payment to owners 
of land less than an acre in area surrounded by other lands 
under an oil and gas lease, makes no provision for segregating 
production according to its source and dividing the specified 
payments on that basis between the current owner of the land 
included and the owner of the land at the time it was deemed 
included; instead, it ties the right to payments to the owner-
ship of the oil and gas mineral rights in the land and makes 
clear that the entire payments are appurtenant to those rights. 
i6] ld. - Regulation - Well Spacing: Leases - Royalties - Oom-
munity Lea.se.-Community leases are only one method for 
achieving common oil development, and whether in any given 
agreement for unit development the rules governing community 
oil leases will be applicable between the parties ,vill depend 
on the terms of the agreement. These rules mayor may not 
apply among the actual parties to a lease in which land is 
deemed included pursuant to Pub. Resources Code, § 3608, 
providing for payment to owners of land less than an acre 
in area surrounded by other lands under an oil and gas leal!le, 
Ilnd there is no basis for assuming that those rules are implicit 
in the code section. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. John F. McCarthy, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to establish right to a prorated share of oil royalties. 
Judgment for defendants after demurrers to complaint were 
sustained without leave to amend, affirmed. 
Joseph R. Grillo for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
William E. Woodroof and William D. Foote for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In 1955 plaintiff owned less than one acre 
of land that was surrounded by other lands subject to an oil 
and gas lease held by defendant Richfield Oil Corporation as 
lessee. Richfield recorded a declaration of pooling individual 
oil and gas leases held by it in the vicinity into Operating 
Unit A and filed a notice of intention to drill on the land 
surrounding plaintiff's land. On March 14, 1955, pursuant 
to section 3608 of the Public Resources Code, the State Oil 
and Gas Supervisor recorded a der.laration that plaintiff'::; 
land was deemed to be included in Richfield's Operating-
Unit A. On March 18, 1955, plaintiff sold and conveyed her 
land to defendants Kalmikov, and on May 12, 1955, the Kal. 
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mikovs sold and conveyed the land to defendants Flores but 
reserved to themselves "all oil, gas, mineral and any other 
kindred substances in, on or under said land but without right 
of surface entry to said property." 
In 1955 section 3608 of the Public Resources Code provided:1 
"Where land aggregating less than one acre is surrounded 
by other lands, which other lands are subject to an oil and gas 
lease aggregating one acre or more, and if, under the provisions 
of Sections 3600 to 3607, inclusive, of the Public Resources 
Code, the drilling or producing of a well on said land is 
declared to be a public nuisance, said land shall, for oil and 
gas development purposes and to prevent waste and to protect 
the oil and gas rights of landowners, be deemed included in 
said oil and gas leasehold on said other lands when there is 
filed with the State Oil and Gas Supervisor a notice of inten-
tion to drill a well upon the said leasehold covering said other 
lands and the State Oil and Gas Supervisor has caused to be 
recorded with the county recorder of the county in which said 
land aggregating less than one acre is located a declaration 
as hereinafter provided .... 
"The owners of the oil and gas mineral rights in said land 
so deemed included in said oil and gas leasehold on said other 
lands, as herein provided, shall thereafter receive in money, 
based upon the production of oil and gas from said leasehold 
including said land, a pro rata share of the landowners' 
royalty determined in accordance with the provisions of said 
oil and gas lease in the proportion that the area of said land 
bears to the aggregate of the total area covered by said oil 
and gas lease including the area of said land; provided further, 
that said owners of said oil and gas mineral rights in said 
land shall in no case receive less than their pro rata share 
determined, as herein provided, on the value of one-eighth 
part of the oil and gas produced ... ; and provided further, 
that without the consent of said owners of said land the lessee 
or operator of said oil and gas leasehold shall have no right 
to use the surface of said land nor to use the subsurface thereof 
down to a depth of 200 feet below the surface thereof .... " 
Plaintiff brought this action to establish her right to royal-
ties accruing pursuant to this section. The Flores defaulted 
and Richfield Rnd the Kalmikovs demurred to the complaint. 
Their demurrers were sustained without leave to amend and 
judgment was entered for them. Plaintiff appeals. 
'Section 3608 was amended in 1957 in respeets not material to this 
action. 
c 
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Plaintiff contends that the "owners of the oil and gas min-
eral rights in said land so deemed included in said oil and gas 
leasehold" to whom the royalties are payable are the owner 
or owners of those rights at the time the land is deemed to be 
included; not the owner or owners at the times thereafter when 
royalties are payable. She therefore concludes that the right 
to receive. royalties pursuant to section 3608 is not appurtenant 
to the land deemed included in the lease and did not pass to 
the Kalmikovs when she conveyed the land to them. 
Defendants contend that the owners referred to are the 
owner or owners at the time royalties are payable and that 
therefore the right to royalties created by section 3608 is 
appurtenant to the oil and gas rights in the included land 
and passes with a conveyance of that land unless the oil and 
gas rights or the right created by section 3608 are reserved. 
[1] We agree with defendants' contention. The statute 
provides, not that the owners of the oil and gas mineral rights 
at the time the land is deemed included shall receive the royal-
ties, but that after that time the owners of those rights shall 
receive the royalties. Since the statute contemplates a con-
tinuing relationship between the owners of those rights and 
the lessee, it reasonably follows that it is the current owners 
who are to be paid. 
This conclusion is supported by the legislative history of 
section 3608. In Hunter v. Justice's Court, 36 Ca1.2d 315, 317 
[223 P.2d 465], we pointed out that "Section 3608 was prob-
ably adopted in response to this court's decision in Bernstein 
v. Bush, 29 Ca1.2d 773 [177 P.2d 913], where it was held that 
the spacing requirement (§ 3600) as applied to the owners 
of several small pieces of property was invalid for the reason 
that they were wholly deprived of the right to take oil from 
their land in that they could not drill an offset well on their 
land to prevent the draining of the underlying oil basin by 
wells on adjacent land and that 'where, ... the law, in its 
application at least, does not afford adequate means of pro-
tection as a substitute for the right to drill an offset well' 
it is invalidly applied." [2 ] We sustained the validity of 
section 3608 in the Hunter case and held that it gave the peti-
tioner therein "an 'adequate means of protection or substi-
tute,' for his right to extract oil from his property." That 
right belongs to the owner of the land and passes with a con-
veyance of the land unless it is severed by a reservation or has 
been severed by a prior grant. To be effective, a substitute for 
) 
.) 
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that right must necessarily inure to its owner. Section 3608 
provides that it does so inure, and it in no way purports to 
sever the right to receive royalties from the ownership of the 
oil and gas mineral rights for the duration of the lease in which 
the land is deemed included. 
[3] Plainti1f contends, however, that section 3608 in effect 
made her a community lessor with Richfield's other lessors 
. when her land was deemed included in Operating Unit A and 
that therefore the rules governing community oil leases are 
applicable. Those rules were stated in Tanner v. Title IftS1lr-
once & Trust Co., 20 Ca1.2d 814, 820 [129 P.2d 383], as follows: 
"By executing the community lease, the respondents and 
each of the other lessors assigned or conveyed to his colessors 
a percentage interest in all oil produced on his land by the 
lessee during the continuance of the lease. The consideration 
for that transfer was the similar mutual assignments of the 
other lessors. The royalty interest thus transferred by each 
landowner to his colessors is an incorporeal hereditament in 
gross (Ca'lJ,oJum v. Marlin, supra [3 Oa1.2d 110 (43 P.2d 788, 
101 A.L.R. 871)]) and the grantee's interest in the oil pro-
duced upon the property of one of the colessors is entirely 
separate and distinct from the royalty interest retained by 
him in oil which might be produced from his own premises. 
The only connection between the two interests is that the 
prorata assignment by one of the lessors of the royalty from 
his land is the consideration for the conveyance of the other 
lessors to him. 
"Although the cases clearly establish that the percentage 
of the royalty reserved by a lessor in oil produced from his 
land passes to a grantee of the fee as an incident of the con-
veyance (see cases collected in note 94 A.L.R. 660), except as 
such rights are reserved by the deed, the incorporeal heredita-
ment owned by the grantor in the oil produced from the land 
of the colessors, existing in gross,· obviously does not follow 
the conveyance of the lessor's land, but can only be conveyed 
by a specific transfer of that interest." 
It is immediately apparent that the rules stated with re-
spect to a community oil lease of the kind that was before 
the court in the Tanner case do not l1t the pattern established 
by section 3608 for compensating owners who have been de-
prived of the right to recover oil and gas from their lands. 
Thus, the Tanner rules are based on the existence of cross-
conveyances. Section 3608 makes no provision for cross-con-
.veyances. [4] The Tanner rules require segregating the 
Aug. 1961] LEBARD v. RICHFIELD OIL CORP. 
{56 C.2d 532; 15 Cal.Rptr. 617. 364 P.2d MIl] 
537 
oil and gas produced from each parcel included in the lease, 
for the lessor's royalty from oil and gas produced from his 
own land is appurtenant whereas his royalty from oil and gas 
produced from the land of his colessors is in gross. Section 
3608 makes no provision for segregating production accord-
ing to its source and dividing the specified payments on that 
basis between the current owner of the land deemed included 
and the owner of that land at the time that it was deemed 
included. Instead, it ties the right to payments to the owner-
ship of the oil and gas mineral rights in the land and makes 
clear that the entire payments are appurtenant to those rights. 
If community leasefl of the kind considered in Tanner repre-
sented the exclusive or even preponderant method of develop-
ing oil lands owned by many persons, there might be reason 
to interpret section 3608 to fit the pattern of the Tanner rules, 
although to do so would compel implying legislative purpose 
and provision not readily apparent from the language of the 
statute. [ 5 ] Community leases are only one method for 
achieving common oil development, however, and agreements 
for the pooling of individual leases, as in this case, and 
other forms of unit operation are not uncommon. Whether 
in any given agreement for unit development, the Tanner rules 
will be applicable between the parties will depend on the terms 
of the agreement. Moreover, it would not be unreasonable for 
the parties to provide that all of the royalties payable to an 
individual lessor pursuant to unit operation should be appur-
tenant to his land to avoid the problem of apportionment that 
arises under the Tanner rules in the event of a sale without 
a reservation of the mineral rights or an assignment of the 
royalties held in gross. Richfield contends that the pooling 
provisions of the individual leases it has pooled into Operating 
Unit A in this case do so provide and urges that we so hold. 
Weare here concerned, however, with the rights provided by 
section 3608; not with the rights of the parties who voluntarily 
entered leases with Richfield. It would be inappropriate to 
pass on their rights in their absence. It is sufficient to note 
that the Tanner rules mayor may not apply among the actual 
parties to a lease in which land is deemed included pursuant to 
section 3608 and that there is therefore no basis for assuming 
that those rules are implicit in the statute. 
Plaintiff's ri~ht to receive the payments provided by section 
3608 terminated when she transferred her land without re-
r;:erving the oil and gas mineral rights therein, and since she 
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has not alleged that any royalties accrued before that transfer, 
her complaint does not state a cause of action. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dool-
ing, J., concurred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would reverse the judgment 
for the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Ashburn in the dis-
senting opinion prepared by him for the District Court of 
Appeal in LeBard v. Richfield Oil Corp. (Cal.App.), 12 Cal. 
Rptr.288. 
